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EDITORIAL

Lord Haldane's book, *The Philosophy of Humanism*, has more significance than might appear at first sight for Christian apologetic. His purpose is "to find, if possible, some common denominator for all knowledge, and to bring within the light cast by the principle of its relativity the aspects of human experience which stand in contrast with what we call scientific knowledge." Among these aspects is religion. It is interesting to note how the conception of different "levels" of experience and of reality, which plays so large a part in Baron von Hügel's *Essays and Addresses*, is cardinal in Lord Haldane's epistemology too. For him, as for Aristotle, the actual is "the foundational fact of reality."

"We work in truth from what is above and concrete to what is below and more abstract. We find in our experience what suggests such conceptions as freedom, mind, life, causation. Going further, in reflection, we can limit ourselves, as does the pure mathematician, to mere order of series in externality. But we can also employ, as not less suggested for definition by the actual, conceptions like those of value, as in art and in religion. Thus we find that the universe displays its actuality from many standpoints, and that these standpoints give us distinct forms at different levels, not only of knowledge but of reality. . . . What is actual fact thus presents many aspects. The living organism is a mechanism from the standpoint of the physicist and the chemist, a useful and essential standpoint. But this is yet only a partial standpoint which yields no more than an aspect in which the real here presents itself. The aspect in which that real is living is a different aspect that cannot be reduced to, or rendered in, terms of the first. It belongs to a different order in knowledge."

And when the philosopher speaks of "degrees or levels in knowledge and reality which constitute a hierarchy within the all-embracing fact of mind," he reminds us of that old title of "the queen of the sciences," which used to be accorded to Theology.

We draw attention to this book because we believe that religion will do well to make its exodus from the Egypt of

scientific monism in company with those other activities of man —Literature, Music, Art, and so forth—which are comprised in the term "Humanism." But, of course, further discriminations must follow. The Church is the priesthood of this pilgrimage. It worships, not values, but Personal Being: revealed in its experience is the Abiding and Prevenient Reality, God. Without the work of this priesthood Humanism must inscribe its altar with the words, "To God unknown." The Catholic Church claims to know and to declare Him, and, though its knowledge is still relative—for "we see through a glass darkly"—to give strength and leading by this knowledge to all that is best in man.

Lord Haldane instances the Oxford Movement as "notwithstanding its failure, which we now see clearly to have been inevitable . . . an illustration of Humanism in a very lofty form." He does not say wherein he thinks the failure to consist; but a later allusion to Newman suggests that he has in mind the limits of its theology. Those were largely prescribed by circumstances, and have no doubt broken down. But the result has been gain, not loss. As a result of the Tractarian appeal to antiquity a wholly new view of the Christian life was recaptured for the English Church. We call it the Catholic view. That, again, has had fertile issues. For it has given us a sympathetic understanding of Roman and of Eastern Catholicism of our own time, which is of great significance. Beneath jurisdiction and traditions widely different from our own we recognize a common heritage of spiritual experience, on the whole breadth of which we take our stand in our intellectual defence of Christianity. We supplement the appeal to antiquity with another appeal, and one which antiquity itself constantly used —the appeal to contemporary doctrine and practice in other parts of the Catholic Church.

No doubt the Reformation involves for us, when we use this appeal, a measure of caution and discrimination which was not necessary for a Cyril or a Cyprian. We suspect, in fact, that the right and duty of exercising that criticism will prove the most solid and permanent of all its theological bequests to later Christendom. Only let us remember that a discriminating appeal is a very different thing from no appeal at all. We have heard this appeal described as "the passage of a frontier." We should rather describe it as the conversion of a war frontier into a peace frontier. The frontier between Canada and the United States is not less real than that between Germany and France. But it ministers, just because it is unfortified, much more effectively to the good of either country.

A STUDY OF JOHN BUNYAN

VARIOUS causes conspire to make Bunyan's spiritual history one of peculiar interest, and also one which especially lends itself to psychological study in present times. Not only is his claim to rank among the geniuses of religion undisputed, but *Pilgrim's Progress* testifies to natural literary endowments of an uncommon order, and his life, though he began in a village farrier's shop, was spent in the hurly-burly of public interests and affairs. He has been fortunate, moreover, to find in the Rev. John Brown and in Mark Rutherford biographers of exceptional merit, and in Macaulay a critic of acknowledged gifts. Finally, he has left us in *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners* a personal record, which provides us with ample and detailed evidence (except in the matter of dates) of his profoundest inward experiences. The contrast between this testimony and Macaulay's account of the same facts reveals, with impressive clearness, the *differentia* of religious experience.

Macaulay's attitude to the supernatural element in Bunyan's experience is so typical of Whig philosophy in every age, that it may well be quoted at some length. The passage comes from the early pages of the *Essay on Bunyan*, which was written originally in 1854 for the eighth and ninth editions of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

"It has long been an ordinary practice with pious writers to cite Bunyan as an instance of the supernatural power of divine grace to rescue the human soul from the lowest depths of wickedness. He is called in one book the most notorious of profligates; in another, the brand plucked from the burning. He is designated in Mr. Irvine's *History of the Baptists* as the depraved Bunyan, the wicked tinker of Elstow. . . . But whoever takes the trouble to examine the evidence will find that the good men who wrote thus had been deceived by a phraseology which, as they had been hearing it and using it all their lives, they ought to have understood better. There cannot be a greater mistake than to infer, from the strong expressions in which a devout man bemoans his exceeding sinfulness, that he had led a worse life than his neighbours. . . . It is quite certain that Bunyan was, at eighteen, what, in any but the most austerely puritanical circles, would have been considered as a young man of singular gravity and innocence. . . . He declares, it is true, that he had let loose the reins on the neck of his lusts, that he had delighted in all transgressions against the divine law, and that he had been the ringleader of the youth of Elstow in all manner of vice. But, when those who wished him ill accused him of licentious amours, he called on God and the angels to attest his purity. No woman, he said, in heaven, earth, or hell, could charge him with having ever made any improper advances to her. Not only had he been strictly faithful to his wife; but he had even

before his marriage been perfectly spotless. It does not appear from his own confessions, or from the railings of his enemies, that he ever was drunk in his life. One bad habit he contracted, that of using profane language; but he tells us that a single reproof cured him so effectually that he never offended again. The worst that can be laid to the charge of this poor youth, whom it has been the fashion to represent as the most desperate of reprobates, as a village Rochester, is that he had a great liking for some diversions, quite harmless in themselves, but condemned by the rigid precisians among whom he lived, and for whose opinion he had a great respect. The four chief sins of which he was guilty were dancing, ringing the bells of the parish church, playing at tip-cat, and reading the history of Sir Bevis of Southampton. A rector of the school of Laud would have held such a young man up to the whole parish as a model. But Bunyan's notions of good and evil had been learned in a very different school; and he was made miserable by the conflict between his tastes and his scruples."*

In this passage Macaulay has set himself to whitewash Bunyan, and has no doubt succeeded to his own satisfaction; but he has done it in a way which shows that he has entirely missed the significance of what he is describing. He cannot conceive of the problem of conduct as more than the problem of particular actions, nor of serious sin, except in connection with intemperance or sexual unchastity. We are given to suppose that the case is one of a youth of strong natural virtues and sensitive conscience, who allowed himself to be narrowed and embittered by the society of "rigid precisians" in which he lived. It would be difficult on this hypothesis to guess how, from this unlikely soil, should have sprung the work which has placed Bunyan among the Immortals.

Bunyan's own testimony to what occurred is very different; and, fortunately, modern psychology enables us to understand his spiritual autobiography more richly than heretofore. Indeed, the record of inward conflict in *Grace Abounding* provides illustration of all the main features now recognized as symptomatic of the different types of conversion. The theory I shall follow in dealing with it, and the terminology I shall use, are taken from two striking articles by a contemporary psychologist, Mr. Robert H. Thouless.† Accepting Mr. Thouless's classification of conversion experiences into (1) adolescent conversions, (2) normal adult conversions, and (3) mystical conversions, we note that Bunyan experienced certainly the last two, and possibly all three. Doubt exists as regards the first, because it is not clear that the spiritual conflict of his early (tenth and eleventh) years did, in fact, ever come to a head; and the case is complicated throughout, because the

* *Five Essays*, by Lord Macaulay, pp. 28-30 (G. Bell and Sons, 1914).
† See THEOLOGY, I. 327 *ff.*; II. 67 *ff.*

conflict proper to mystical conversion, which occupies the whole second half of the record, also underlay and interpenetrated the simpler moral conflict of his normal adult conversion. This fact, while it adds difficulty to the analysis, makes the case one of exceptional significance.

Of the earliest stage the most striking symptom is the fearful dreams and nightmares which the child suffered in sleep, and in which the torments of hell figured largely. As he outgrew these, and entered more and more into the life of his fellow lads at Elstow, he contracted a strong resistance to religion: "I could neither endure it myself," he says, "nor that any other should"; though even then he was subject to extreme painful emotion, if he heard or saw wrong-doing in someone who made profession of piety. It does not seem, however, that this adolescent conflict was ever resolved.

At the age of twenty-one Bunyan married. His wife had been religiously brought up, introduced him to two books of devotion, and got him to go regularly to church. The dignity and order of liturgical worship made a strong appeal to him, and evidently satisfied some part of those instincts constituting the "complex" with which he was unwittingly wrestling. One Sunday he was deeply moved by the parson's sermon on Sabbath observance, which he felt to be directed at himself; and this was followed by a vivid audition and vision, while he was playing tip-cat on the same afternoon. The effect was very striking. He concluded that there was no hope for him, and that he "had as good be damned for many sins as be damned for few"; and he "returned desperately" to his sport again. This he did for a month, when two further experiences supervened. A loose woman who heard him swearing rebuked him, and thereafter he gave up the profane language, which had been his chief outward fault: and a poor man whom he chanced to meet turned him to Bible-reading, with the result that he undertook seriously to reform himself.

"Thus I continued about a year; all which time our neighbours did take me to be a very godly man, a new religious man, and did marvel much to see such a great and famous alteration in my life and manners; and indeed so it was, though I knew not Christ, nor grace, nor faith, nor hope; for, as I have well seen since, had I then died, my state had been most fearful."

He adds that his neighbours' praises pleased him well. "I was proud of my godliness, and, indeed, I did all I did, either to be seen of, or to be well spoken of by, men: and thus I continued for about a twelvemonth or more."

I take this change in the neighbours' attitude as marking

the climax of the second stage of Bunyan's conflict—the stage roughly corresponding to normal adult conversion. It is of interest to our present purpose for several reasons. In the first place, it appears to represent precisely that level of experience and life which alone Macaulay shows himself able to appreciate in his Essay. He had become a respectable person. Secondly, of the three elements—the intellectual, the moral, and the social—which tend to give predominant colour to conversion experiences, the two last are strongly represented, and appear to reach a provisional satisfaction: the moral element in the decisive abandonment of profanity, the social in the fellowship of the respectable neighbours. The intellectual alone is unsatisfied, showing itself as an occasional irritant, as in the question whether he were one of the true Israelites to whom the promises were made. It is this intellectual element which acts as a sign-post to our third point—viz., that this stage exhibits unmistakable intimations of those deeper levels of experience which Bunyan was to pass through in the course of the mystical conflict still before him. Had the story recorded in *Grace Abounding* stopped short with Bunyan's entry into pious society, we should still have a valuable document of religious experience; but we should never have had *Pilgrim's Progress*. For that work presupposes an insight such as only comes through spiritual conflict and temptation. We may thank God that Bunyan was not as Macaulay portrayed him.

The abandonment of such innocent pursuits as bell-ringing and dancing seems to provide the natural introduction to the third and longest stage of Bunyan's conflict; since, as Mr. Thouless points out, a marked feature of mystical conversion is "the indiscriminate repression of human activities which other people regard as good with those which are generally considered bad." Moral justification of this conduct is often difficult to discover; but it seems probable that in Bunyan's case two elements combined to cause it. One was the reaction against the associations connected in his mind with these entertainments. The other was a more subtle influence. It is evident that one of the strongest constituents of Bunyan's religious complex was the emotion of fear; and the slender allusions which he makes to his childhood are sufficient to make it probable that "the fear of God" had been impressed on him during his upbringing in that stark fashion so characteristic of seventeenth-century Puritanism. Clearly, too, this element of fear had much to do with his decision to abandon bell-ringing; his dread of the bell or the steeple falling, while he only watched the bells being rung, attests so much. It is not unlikely that such anxieties had presented themselves to

Bunyan, only to be sternly repressed, when he first began to handle the ropes; and it would thus not be surprising that, when his religious sentiments became active, the fear which played so large a part in them should awaken those other close-lying fears which he had striven to drive away.

Be that as it may, Bunyan now enters upon a period of acute mental and spiritual conflict. The struggle is essentially not one between good and evil, but between Nature and Supernature; between the natural man and the man new-born in Christ. What he seeks is not a unification of sentiments and impulses on the natural level—that he already had; but a unification wholly on the level of grace, a thorough interpenetration of his own personality by Jesus Christ. This consummation is symbolized for him in different religious terms; now it is Faith, now Calling, now Pardon, now Election. And particular interest attaches to the "resistances" which prevented this complex passing into conscious experience. Allusion has already been made to the fact that Bunyan's moral conversion found him with an acute intellectual problem still unsolved. Similarly, throughout the third period, intellectual questionings account for a large part of the conflict. Indeed, Bunyan provides a significant warning of the mischief which a distorted theology may do. Unable to assure himself that he had fulfilled the scriptural conditions of salvation, he fell into agonies of doubt and despair; broke into violent blasphemies of thought; desired to commit, and for a long time believed that he had committed, the unforgivable sin. Yet beneath the strange jargon of Puritan argumentation, it is evident that there was a real clash of elemental spiritual forces—himself and God. The unspoken blasphemies are the index of a heart in which self-assertion and pride are still potently operative. And, as the kindred experience of Bishop Butler shows, they are a temptation to which the highest spiritual natures are peculiarly prone. They are of a piece with the fact, pointed out by Baron von Hügel, that for Christians "Pride or self-sufficiency is the central, typical sin." Bunyan always appears as struggling against the least relic or vestige of self-sufficiency, and striving to be God-determined wholly and only. It was these vestiges of pride which seemed to be revealed in what he poignantly calls "those sentences that stood against me"; which made it so dangerous to abide in any of those "rests" which God had given him on his pilgrimage to the Infinite, and which were finally subdued and sublimated when he came to see that his only righteousness was Jesus Christ, "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever."

"Now did my chains fall off my legs indeed; I was loosed

from my afflictions and irons; my temptations also fled away: so that from that time those dreadful Scriptures of God left off to trouble me: now went I also home rejoicing, for the grace and love of God. . . . Here, therefore, I lived for some time, very sweetly at peace with God through Christ; oh, methought, Christ! Christ! there was nothing but Christ that was before my eyes. I was not now (only) for looking upon this and the other benefits of Christ apart, as of His blood, burial, or resurrection, but considering Him as a whole Christ; as He in whom all these, and all other His virtues, relations, offices, and operations met together, and that He sat on the right hand of God in heaven. . . . Further, the Lord did also lead me into the mystery of union with the Son of God, that I was joined to Him, 'that I was flesh of His flesh, and bone of His bone,' and now was that word of St. Paul sweet to me. By this also was my faith in Him, as my righteousness, the more confirmed in me; for if He and I were one, then His righteousness was mine, His merits mine, His victory also mine. Now could I see myself in heaven and earth at once; in heaven by my Christ, by my head, by my righteousness and life, though on earth by my body and person."

So was prepared the soul of the man who was to illuminate for all time the road of those who are pilgrims to the Celestial City.

We have studied this example of religious experience in such detail, not because it is typical of normal Christian experience, but because the contrast between Macaulay's and Bunyan's accounts of the same history sets in so clear a light the "new facts," as William James calls them, which religion introduces. We cannot here pause to consider the interpretation which sees in these "new facts" nothing but the phenomena of auto-suggestion or of herd-suggestion. Whatever be the upshot of that discussion, it is evident that Macaulay and Bunyan are working along different levels of experience, in which the same external occurrences have a completely different significance. For the former they belong to a series in time and place, whose meaning is completely weighed in the balances of social utility: for the latter, time and place are like the screen on which pictures are thrown by a magic-lantern; the real work is going on behind in the dark, where the Great Operator with muffled lantern sets human experience against "the white radiance of eternity."

Meanwhile, there is another aspect of Bunyan's spiritual conflict which may fitly serve as introduction to the concluding section of this article. To those who regard religion as purely

subjective this much truth may be at once conceded, that in all religious experience suggestion plays an important part. The well-known influence of preaching in effecting adolescent conversion is an example of this; and we have seen how Bunyan, though then past the age of adolescence, was impressed by one sermon of his parish priest. But preaching is only one of the instruments or channels through which suggestion is exercised. It seems not improbable that, if the evidence were carefully examined, all conversion experiences would be found to be mediated from, and to, some kind of religious group and community. Often the individual is so preoccupied with their transcendent effects that he abstracts from the spiritual experience of his neighbours, and believes himself to be the sole recipient of the grace which he experiences. There are strong traces of this in *Grace Abounding*, but other things can be read between the lines. Of the influence of his home and schooling we know little; but we have seen how he was affected by his wife and her two books, by the Church services and ritual, by the loose woman's rebuke, and by the poor man who turned him towards Bible-reading. One may wonder whether the magnificent ceremonial of the entry to the Celestial City in *Pilgrim's Progress* may not be a transfiguration of experiences first met with in his parish church. But there are other contacts with the Christian community apparently more decisive for his spiritual history; and we may well attend to these.

1. I take first the meeting in Bedford with "three or four poor women sitting at a door, in the sun, talking about the things of God. . . . And, methought, they spake as if joy did make them speak; they spake with such pleasantness of Scripture language and with such appearance of grace in all they said, that they were to me as if they had found a new world; as if they were 'people that dwelt alone, and were not to be reckoned among their neighbours.'" The immediate result of this meeting was greatly to deepen the inwardness of Bunyan's religion. He began to take notice of "secret thoughts," "to look into the Bible with new eyes," and to rid himself of bad company. Finally, his experience was reproduced and universalized "in a kind of vision." He saw "as if they were on the sunny side of some high mountain," while he was "shivering and shrinking in the cold, afflicted with frost, snow, and dark clouds," separated from them by a wall. At last he descried in the wall a narrow gap, through which, after many failures, he "went and sat down in the midst of them, and so was comforted with the light and heat of their sun." And his interpretation of the vision was that "the mountain signified the Church of the living God; the sun that shone thereon, the

comfortable shining of His merciful face on them that were therein; the wall I thought was the world, that did make separation between the Christians and the world; and the gap which was in the wall I thought was Jesus Christ, who is the way to God the Father."

The psychologist will be interested in tracing here the materials of the vision in preceding experience, and in pointing out how the meeting with the women, the separation from worldly companions, and the reading of the Bible (particularly if it were of the last three chapters of the *Revelation*) seem to provide these. For our present purpose, the point I wish to stress is the operation of the social element in the spiritual experience. It is the four joyful Christians who occasion the process which culminates in the vision; and the end of the vision is the welcoming of the subject into fellowship with " the Church of the living God."

2. Unfortunately, not all Bunyan's contact with the Christian community was as happy as this. The dominating influence during the years of Bunyan's spiritual conflict was the personality and preaching of Mr. Gifford. The career of this remarkable man makes astonishing reading to-day. A man of Kent, he fought as a major in the Royalist Army, which in 1648 won back the southern part of the county to the King. At Maidstone, where Fairfax inflicted signal defeat on this force, he was taken prisoner and condemned to death. On the eve of execution he escaped from gaol by the aid of his sister, and made his way in disguise, first to London, and then to Bedford, where he practised as a doctor and was notorious for his loose life. Before long, however, he was converted, attached himself to the Congregational body, and became the pastor of their little community. In 1653 the benefice of St. John the Baptist, Bedford, falling vacant, the mayor and corporation, in whose gift it lay, presented Gifford to the living; and it was there in the same year that John Bunyan became a definite member of his congregation.

Particular interest attaches to the contact of these two men, which seems to have begun in 1651 or 1652; for Bunyan's record of his experience from this time onward becomes detailed, and we get a vivid glimpse of the type of Christianity which Gifford and his Church presented. The immediate effect of its impact on Bunyan was to intensify his sense of sin, until he became convinced that he was damned. The narrative here shows unmistakable signs of the preacher's Calvinistic theology; and it would appear as though Gifford suggested to Bunyan many of those forms in which his " resistances " to conversion clothed themselves. Moreover, the despair into

which he fell is accompanied by a marked lack of charity and of sympathy with the troubles of ordinary men, of which he is evidently in no way ashamed. For a year he absented himself from church, and passed through a period of great desolation. But he then returned to Mr. Gifford's ministrations, and found them as seasonable to his soul " as the former and the latter rains in their seasons." An experience of grace followed, which made him amenable to some regular instruction. The historical facts of Christ's Birth, Life, Death, and Resurrection came to have a meaning for him, as did the doctrine of the Incarnation; as a result of which he contracted a vehement distaste for the Quakers, whom he believed to deny these things, and for others of his contemporaries, whose sincerity he questioned. But, though Bunyan later looked back to this experience as marking a solid gain in his spiritual life, it was not permanent, and there followed many months of acute doubt, discouragement, and despair.

3. The first break in the cloud of despair occurred one day when Bunyan was " in a meeting of God's people." We do not know what kind of meeting it was; and the experience was not final in bringing peace to the subject. But it redirected the stream of his emotions and thoughts, and gave him a ground of hope which never forsook him again for long.

A survey of the social element in Bunyan's religious conflict is found, therefore, to reveal a very mixed colour in the " suggestions " to which he was exposed. That of the four poor women, and that of " the meeting of God's people " (so far as it went), seem to have been wholly beneficial; they made for inward unification and for charity towards others. We cannot pass so unqualified a verdict on the influence of Mr. Gifford. Mr. Gifford's teaching represents the religious experience of a community, and its expression and systematization in a particular theological tradition. The vital element in this experience is the Supernatural revealed in cleansed and purified lives. But this very apprehension of God in Christ as the holiness of the converted individual has so preoccupied the subjects of it as to blind them to other aspects of experience; and the Divine justice is so presented as to terrify and repel all whose experience is not of the same intensity and focussed in the same factors. Hence Bunyan's years of despair, and of brooding over the unforgivable sin and other hard sentences of Scripture; hence, too, through the drying up of the veins of active sympathy, his lack of charity. His was a soul that could never have found God to be Love without great storm and trial within, all the more since he seems to have had his emotions of fear developed in his upbringing. But undoubtedly

his experience of God as Love would have come more normally and met with less "resistance," had Mr. Gifford's suggestions sprung from a broader-based and more human theology, and had the community he represented been less rigorist in its conception of Faith. Here, if ever, in Bunyan was a man crying out for the ministry of reconciliation. Both parson and pastor failed him; and for want of one to do for him what Ananias did for St. Paul, he was condemned to long struggles "as in a miry bog," and to fruitless torments which need not have been his.

The history of John Bunyan, therefore, is an impressive witness not only to the reality and distinctness of religious experience, but also to the vital necessity that whatever is mediated in religious experience by human means should be rightly and truly mediated; that the community which preserves and transmits all that is communicable in religious experience should itself embrace every variety and aspect of that experience; and that this catholicity of experience should find expression in *formulæ* of adequate range to so vast a field, and be mediated in ways which will not misrepresent its inexhaustible richness. In other words, what is needed is an Authority co-extensive with the whole field of the relevant—that is, of Christian—experience; one which sacrifices none of the facts to premature theories, whether of a narrow theology or of a narrow scientific philosophy, and which insists on the ethical end of religion—namely, Charity—as the best criterion of Truth.

E. G. Selwyn.

MAINTENANCE OF THE CLERGY IN THE EARLY CHURCH

"Like the successors of the non-juring Bishops in the eighteenth century, or like the earlier preachers of the Wesleyan Methodists, the officers of the earlier Christian communities worked at trades, kept shops, took part in municipal affairs, and wore the dress of ordinary citizens."

This is the dictum of Dr. Hatch. In view of the present shortage of clergy and the inadequate maintenance of what clergy there are, it seems worth while to make some inquiry into the matter, in order to see what actually was the practice in the primitive Church, though, of course, it does not follow that the practice is suitable to these times, even if we can discover what it was.

In the New Testament the classic passage is 1 Cor. ix.: "Who at any time campaigns at his own charges? Who plants a vineyard and does not eat the fruit of it? Who feeds a flock and does not feed on the milk of the flock? Is it not written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn? He that plougheth ought to plough in hope, and he that thresheth in hope of partaking. If we have sown you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things? . . . Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things eat the offerings from the temple, and they which serve at the altar are sharers in the gifts of the altar? Even so, hath the Lord ordained that those which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel."

This passage might seem to dispose of the question so far as the apostolic Church is concerned. The rule is that those who preach the Gospel are to be supported by those to whom they preach, St. Paul's own case being an exception. But looked at a little longer, the matter is not so clear. St. Paul is plainly thinking of himself and others in the like case—Apostles and Evangelists. Whatever else they were—or were not—they were certainly *itinerant*, not *localized*, ministers. St. Paul had a trade which, like knife and scissor grinding, could be carried on by an itinerant—possibly it could not be carried on except by an itinerant. So had St. Luke. The fisherman, the tax-collector, the carpenter, the shopkeeper, had not. Such must live on offerings or starve. But the localized ministers were in a different position. They form a special class. For leaving on one side the vexed questions of appointment and succession, and the precise position of the Bishop, it is plain that there were localized ministers—certainly Presbyters or Presbyter Bishops, and, in some cases, Deacons.

That these localized ministers were *entirely* supported by the offerings of the faithful seems, on the face of it, unlikely, on account of their number. They seem to have been a numerous class. St. Paul and St. Barnabas are said (Acts xiv. 23) to have appointed elders in every Church. In the Epistle to the Philippians, St. Paul writes to the saints with the episcopoi and deacons. He directs Titus to ordain elders in every city. In the Apocalypse the number of Presbyters prostrating themselves before the Throne in the worship of heaven is four-and-twenty. It is likely that this picture of the worship of heaven had been suggested by what the writer had seen on earth. At least, it is significant that in the earliest church order,* commonly called Egyptian, the correct number of elders to take part in the Eucharist is said to be twenty-four—

* Horner, *Statutes of the Apostles*, p. 134.

twelve on the right of the altar, and twelve on the left. However that may be, it seems clear that the Presbyters existed in considerable numbers in New Testament times, and, if so, one does not see how they and their wives and families could have been entirely maintained by the offerings of their tiny flocks.

In 1 Tim. v. 17 we get the direction that the Presbyter who rules well is to be worthy of double *honour*, especially those who labour in word and teaching. The word *honour* here must mean pay, as the direction is reinforced by two quotations from the Old Testament: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox which treadeth out the corn," and "The labourer is worthy of his hire." This shows that the Presbyter received some form of remuneration, but that is not to say he received a living wage or anything like it.

Age

The age of ordination has a bearing on the question. The indications in the Pastoral Epistles go to show that the Presbyter was elderly. He is to be rebuked as a father. He is to have faithful children, not accused of riot and unruly—so presumably more or less grown-up.

St. Peter plainly indicates that the Presbyters were officials. They are to feed the flock of God, and take the oversight of it willingly; they are not to be lords over God's heritage. He goes on naturally to give advice to the *neaniskoi*: "Likewise ye younger submit yourselves to the elder"—a remark which would come in awkwardly if the Presbyters were young men.

In the Egyptian Church Order it is laid down that at ordination—"It is proper for the Presbyters that they should be like old men who have passed the time of intercourse with wives."*

The Council of Neo Cæsarea laid down thirty as the minimum age, but that seems to have been regarded as exceptionally youthful, admitted on the analogy of the age at which our Lord began His ministry, as Jerome (*Epist.* 82 [62] *ad Theoph.*, vol. i., p. 518, quoted by Dr. Hatch) defends the ordination of his brother at that age. According to Dr. Hatch, though Bishops were sometimes created younger, there is no known instance of a Presbyter being ordained earlier until the eighth century, and then only in the outlying parts of Christendom. It was not till 1314 that the Council of Ravenna fixed twenty-five as the minimum age.

The importance of age at ordination is that, if the Presbyter

* Horner, *Statutes of the Apostles*, p. 134.

is ordained as a young man, it is certain that in most cases he must be maintained by the faithful. He cannot support himself, much less his wife and family. If ordained in middle life, or later, he will be presumably self-supporting at the time, and can—that is not to say he necessarily will—but he can maintain himself by his savings or continue to earn his living.

Outside the canon of the New Testament there are few references to the maintenance of the clergy. Tertullian has a doubtful allusion. He is charging heretics with careless and improper ordinations. "At one time they put novices in office, at another time men who are *sæculo obstrictos*,"* which might be translated "bound to some secular employment," but more probably means "in bondage to the world."

Apollonius, writing *circa* 210 against Montanists, is recorded by Eusebius V. xviii. 2 to have charged Montanus with having "provided salaries for those that preached his doctrine, that it might grow strong by gormandizing and gluttony." Eusebius also quotes an anonymous writer against Theodotus, *circa* 230, who says that Natalius was appointed heretical Bishop *with a salary*, as though the salary was discreditable or, at least, unusual.

In the Egyptian Church Order there are specific allusions to offerings made to the clergy. In a later edition of the Ethiopic version we read: "All the first-fruits they shall bring to the Bishops and Presbyters and Deacons for their support. But all the tithes they shall bring for the support of the rest of those in orders, and for the virgins and the widows, for those who are afflicted by poverty, because the first-fruits are for the Priests and their ministers."* There is in an earlier edition, which is repeated in the Saidic but not in the Arabic version, a direction of a somewhat similar kind, though it seems to refer to private offerings made to a particular teacher: "My son—him who spoke to thee the Word of Life, love as the apple of thine eye. . . . Honour them as much as thou canst, both with thy toil and the work of thy hands sustain them, since God has made thee worthy to find them sustenance spiritual; . . . it is proper for thee to give them the perishable food of this world, because the labourer is worthy of his hire. Thou shalt not muzzle the ox in the threshing-floor."†

In the *Didascalia* the Bishop appears to be supported by the Church. He is warned not to incur any but necessary expenses, as the gifts of God are not his own, but he will have to give an account as a good steward: "Do not enjoy yourselves and be luxurious from the income of the Church." They are to provide out of this income for the Deacons and widows and

* Horner, *Statutes of the Apostles*, p. 205. † *Ibid*. p. 131.

orphans, and those in want. There are also exhortations to the laity to bring offerings to the Bishops "who are your High Priests, and Priests and Levites—now Elders and Deacons."*

When an agape was held it was apparently the custom to make it an occasion of gifts to the clergy: "Let the portion of a shepherd be defined and known. . . . As often as is given to you or the widows let double be given to such of the Deacons —twice double to the Governor. If any man wish also to honour the Elders, let him give also to them as to the Deacons. . . . If there be also a Reader, let him also receive along with the Elders. Every office, therefore, let each of the laity honour by gifts, by dignity, and the respect of the world."

Again the Bishop is compared to the Jewish King, and the description of his exactions as portrayed by Samuel is quoted approvingly: "Thus now also the Bishop taketh to himself from the people those whom he considereth to be worthy of him and of his office. . . . Present to him your fruits and the work of your hands. Give to him your Tithes. From them he will require to be nourished, and to provide also for those who are in want."†

The Bishop is not expected to show a balance-sheet: "Do not exact an account of the Bishop: do not watch him as to how he provides and fulfils his stewardship." He is warned not to take alms from the guilty and from those engaged in occupations forbidden to Christians.

It is plain, then, that offerings are made to the clergy, but there is nothing to show that they looked to such offerings for their entire support.

But of all early writers Cyprian has most to tell us. In his treatise *de lapsis* he complains bitterly of the conduct of the Bishops in employing usury and leaving their dioceses, in order to travel on business: "Very many Bishops . . . despising their divine charge, became agents in secular business, forsook their throne, deserted their people, wandered about over foreign countries, hunted the markets for profitable merchandise, and brought no aid to starving brethren in the Church." Here it is not clear whether the charge is of engaging in business as such, or a business which led to neglect of duty. They were also charged with hoarding money, fraud, and usury. We know that in Cyprian's own case he abandoned a lucrative practice at the bar when he became a Bishop.

There are two cases in his letters bearing on the maintenance of the clergy:

1. The case of Geminius Faustinus. Though a Presbyter, he had been named as executor of a will. Cyprian writes:

* *Didascalia Apostolorum*, Gibson, p. 47. † *Ibid.*, p. 52.

"It had long since been decreed in a Council of the Bishops that no one should appoint any of the clergy and ministers of God executor or guardian of his will, since every one honoured by the Divine priesthood, and ordained in the clerical science, ought to serve only the altar and sacrifices, and to have leisure for prayers and supplications. For it is written: 'No man that warreth for God entangleth himself with the affairs of this life.'"

2. In a letter to the clergy and people about the ordination of Celerinus as Reader, he wrote: "Know that I have already purposed the honour of the Presbyter for them, that so they may be honoured with the same presents as the Presbyters, and may share the monthly divisions."

But it seems unlikely that Cyprian's ideal of a clergy, entirely maintained by the faithful and devoting their whole time to their sacred calling, was actually carried out until long afterwards. The Council of Illiberis laid down that Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons were not to trade out of their own district, or to go about in search of the most profitable markets. St. Basil speaks of his clergy as gaining their living by sedentary handicrafts. And Dr. Hatch is able to quote a long list of regulations by Councils from the Council of Illiberis down to that of Mainz, A.D. 813, which deal with the attempts of the clergy to earn their living by secular employment.

The Fourth Council of Carthage, A.D. 397, enacts "that a cleric, however learned in the word of God, shall provide himself with food and clothing by a handicraft or by agriculture; . . . all clerics who have strength to work should learn both handicrafts and letters."* As late as A.D. 813 the Council of Mainz forbade clerics to have unjust weights and measures, or carry on an unjust trade. "Nevertheless, a just trade is not to be forbidden on account of divers necessities,"† and the example of the Apostles is quoted.

Conclusion

1. The Apostle first, and then the Bishop, was a wholetime official and, as a rule, maintained by the Church.

2. The Presbyter. There is no evidence that they were wholly maintained in New Testament times, though they received gifts. Later on, in the third century, under the influence of 1 Cor. ix., written with different circumstances in view, and of Old Testament and heathen parallels, the idea began to prevail that the Presbyter should be a wholetime official entirely maintained by the offerings of the faithful. Still, even so, they

* *Dictionary of Christian Antiquity: Article of Commerce.* † *Ibid.*

were to be supported by offerings, not a regular *stipendium*. In practice it seems doubtful if this were done—*i.e.*, if the offerings amounted to more than an addition to an income derived from other sources.

How far the practice of the primitive Church in these matters might be revived is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the threatened breakdown of the prevailing system at least suggests that we may not be altogether wise in departing so widely from primitive custom. I venture to suggest that we should look for vocations to the priesthood not so much in the school or the university as in the army, the navy, the counting-house, and the workshop; that the best Test School is the world; that men of comparatively advanced years may be quite competent to take charge of small country parishes, or to help to relieve the pressure, especially the Sunday pressure, in big town parishes. I have in mind the ex-headmaster of a large public school, the head of a coaching establishment, and a retired staff-officer, who were so ordained, and vindicated the wisdom of the Bishops who ordained them. Finally, is it fair or wise to ordain men too young for the most part to make a binding resolution of celibacy, for the majority of whom, if married, the Church never will afford a living wage?

C. P. S. Clarke.

THE MARTYRDOM OF ST. JOHN

Until comparatively recent days the traditional view that the Apostle John lived to extreme old age, and died a natural death at Ephesus, as recorded by Irenæus, was almost universally accepted. It was known that in the best manuscript of George the Sinner (ninth century) there was an interpolation which stated on the alleged authority of Papias that he was killed by the Jews; but this was not taken seriously, and it was assumed that there was some misunderstanding. In 1888 De Boor published a fragment, probably from the *Christian History* of Philip of Side († c. 450), which contained the same statement, and though this Philip had always been regarded as an extremely untrustworthy writer, it was naturally taken as tending to confirm the assertion of George the Sinner. Consequently many recent scholars have concluded that the Apostle John was martyred some time before the siege of Jerusalem, and so could not possibly have written either the Gospel or the Apocalypse. Dr. Charles of Westminster, in his recent commentary on

Revelation (vol. i., p. xlix.), regards the Papias tradition among "reasonably established facts of history." Dr. Sanday, in *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel* (p. 252), considered the legend all-important for the truth, or otherwise, of the evidence for the Apostle's stay at Ephesus, apart from which it is impossible to maintain that he wrote the Gospel—"All depends upon the truth of the story of this Apostle's death. . . . I should be much inclined to think that, if the statement is true, there was but one John at Ephesus, the beloved disciple, who was also the Presbyter; and if the statement is false, there was still but one John, who was both Presbyter and Apostle."

The chronicle of Philip of Side is headed by a rubric:

"A collection of different narratives from the birth of our Lord according to the flesh, and onwards, beginning with the first book of the *Ecclesiastical History* of Eusebius Pamphili."

The passage dealing with Papias begins:

"Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis, being a hearer of John the Divine and a companion of Polycarp, wrote five books on the Oracles of the Lord."

He then gives a paraphrase of the well-known passage from Papias preserved by Eusebius, to the effect that in enumerating the Apostles he includes with the disciples the names of Aristion and John the Elder. The next sentences are based on Eusebius's own words with reference to the authorship of the two short Catholic Epistles and the Apocalypse, and a statement that Papias, like Irenæus, had erred with regard to the millennium, likewise from Eusebius. The all-important passage follows:

"Papias, in the second book, says that John the Divine and James his brother were killed by the Jews."

After this we find a statement that Papias, on the authority of the daughters of Philip, related that Barsabas had drunk of adders' poison and had escaped unharmed, and that the mother of Manaimus had been raised from the dead. Finally, at the end of this section dealing with Papias, of whom he is pretending to write the biography, he declares that he (Papias) related with regard to those raised from the dead by Christ, that they lived till the time of Adrian.

If we leave for a moment the statement about the martyrdom of James and John, it is plain that all the rest is based on Eusebius's *History*, only a few details being added, as about "adders' poison" and "the mother of Manaimus." A comparison, however, shows how extraordinarily inaccurate the writer was. Eusebius speaks of only one miracle as told to Papias by the daughters of Philip, the raising of a dead person to life, and though he mentions the miraculous escape of Barsabas he does not say he heard it from the same source.

The statement about those whom Christ raised according to Eusebius, from whom the writer is drawing it, is taken, not from Papias, but from Quadratus, and what he says in his *Apology* to Adrian is not that those restored to life by Christ, presumably all according to our writer, lived till the reign of Adrian, but that some lived to " our own times," a much more reasonable assertion, for Quadratus, like Adrian, must have been born some considerable time before the end of the first century, while Adrian did not reign until 117.

Since all the rest of Philip's account of Papias is derived from Eusebius, we should expect the same of the martyrdom of St. James and St. John. Philip of Side clearly had no knowledge of Papias's writings at first hand, as Dom Chapman makes plain, or he would not have needed to quote from Eusebius. It is very extraordinary, then, that he should seem able to quote definitely from the second book of the *Oracles of the Lord*, as George the Sinner and all commentators have supposed. The truth is that he does not claim to do any such thing, and he is not referring to the second book of Papias's *Oracles* but to the second book of Eusebius's *History*. As in the heading to his chronicle he said he would begin with the first book of the *History*, it is only natural he would quote from the second book also, as certainly he bases his account of Papias for the most part on the third. Unfortunately, few scholars, save Dom Chapman in his valuable monograph, *John the Presbyter and the Fourth Gospel*, have quoted the heading, and so the obvious meaning has been missed. Turning to the second book of Eusebius's *History*, we find in Chapter XXIII. the account of the martyrdom of James, the Lord's brother, at Jerusalem, which he takes from Hegesippus, and following it a passage which he ascribes to Josephus, apparently on the authority of Origen: " These things happened to the Jews to avenge James the Just, who was a brother of Jesus Who is called Christ: for the Jews slew him, although he was a most just man."

Dr. Bernard had already concluded on quite different grounds that the reference in the chronicle was to James, the Lord's brother, and with the words of Eusebius before us there is really no room for doubt, so that the source of the alleged statement of Papias is plain. It may seem almost incredible that anyone should mistake Josephus for Papias, and John and James his brother for James, the Lord's brother, but we are led to this conclusion by the writer's own reference, and this extraordinary inaccuracy is paralleled within a few lines in his work, where he mistakes Quadratus for Papias, and the times of Quadratus for the reign of Adrian. If an excuse for the

blunder be required it is perhaps to be found in the many calendars in which, on December 27, there is a commemoration of John and James, the reference here, too, being properly to the Lord's brother, though often it is otherwise, the order of names, we note, agreeing with that of Philip. In the Syriac calendar (before 411) we read, on December 27, "John and James, the Apostles, at Jerusalem," and with this, or some similar calendar, Philip must have been acquainted. That the names are not necessarily to be regarded as those of martyrs in the strict sense is obvious, for there is a commemoration of Arius, "at Alexandria, Arius the Presbyter," but they, or some of them, might conceivably be so understood, and wrongly, by a person of the confused mentality of Philip.

There is little need to spend much time on the extract, even if authentic, from George the Sinner, another rather untrustworthy writer. He says:

"Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis, being an eyewitness of this man (John), in the second book of the Oracles of the Lord, says that he was killed by the Jews."

He goes on to state that this is corroborated by Origen, which is untrue, for he merely says that he was banished to Patmos. We notice that practically every word of George's account is derived from Philip, and the only point worthy of special notice is the fact that he is the first, so far as we know, to make the mistake with regard to the meaning of "the second book," which so many learned scholars have followed him in making since his day, spending much time and energy in a fruitless discussion which might have been avoided had they looked at the context of the extract they were trying to interpret. The conclusion is plain, that there is no evidence whatever for the martyrdom of St. John, and the traditional view of his long life still holds the field.

W. Lockton.

"SUB OBTENTU RELIGIONIS"

In the Middle Ages, when kings and princes behaved in what the Church considered an unseemly way—when, that is to say, they robbed the churches, interfered with ecclesiastical privilege, broke their crusading vows, or married their cousins, all of which things they very frequently did—the Church had a favourite device for bringing them to a better frame of mind: it excommunicated them. Excommunication was supposed to mean that you were excluded from the benefits of the sacraments of the Church, and if you died under excommunication, your prospects were considered to be very dark indeed. Actually, however, the excommunicated prince did not fare

quite so badly as might be supposed. The medieval Church was a much less perfectly disciplined organization than a modern Trade Union. There were always ecclesiastical "blacklegs": there was always a royalist section of the Church who supported the King, and was willing to administer to him all the sacraments he required, though whether such sacraments were of any validity could, of course, be debated. Indeed, the medieval Church's weapon of offence, like the "strike" weapon of the modern Trade Union, was apt, in practice, to wound the hand that wielded it. Early in the thirteenth century the Pope laid the kingdom of Castile under an Interdict—that is to say, he excommunicated not only the King but the whole body of his subjects, and we have a curious letter of protest written by the Archbishop of Toledo himself: "The Interdict," he says, "is ruining the Church; heresy is spreading; and, since the clergy are out 'on strike,' the laity refuse to pay tithes, and clerks are reduced to begging their bread or even to becoming domestic servants in the households of the Jews!"

The real force of excommunication was not that it deprived princes of spiritual consolations, but that it undermined their political authority. Opposed to the prince there was always the baronage, ready to rebel, and when the prince was excommunicated rebellion became a duty as well as a pleasure. One rebelled *sub obtentu religionis*, under the guise of religion.

But many other things beside rebellion could, on occasion, be done *sub obtentu religionis*. At the same date as this Interdict in Castile, King Sancho I. was ruling in Portugal. He was a good king according to his lights, and a great fighter. He owed an annual tribute to the Papacy, and this he did not pay, and was excommunicated. Some years later, however, he changed his mind. He wrote an exceedingly dutiful and pious letter, enclosing whatever may have been the equivalent of a cheque in that period, and in the course of his letter he begged the Pope (it was the great Innocent III.) to take him under papal protection, "with not only all the territories he possesses, but also all those which, with the aid of God, he can justly acquire in the future." In other words, King Sancho will feel more comfortable if he can despoil his neighbours of their territory *sub obtentu religionis;* it will, as we say, improve the national morale. The Pope closed with this offer, and the blood of King Sancho has flowed in the veins of many subsequent princes. One is reminded of the prayer in *The Critic*, that admirable burlesque by Richard Brinsley Sheridan:

> "Behold thy votaries submissive beg
> That thou wilt deign to grant them all they ask:
> Assist them to accomplish all their ends,
> And sanctify whatever means they use
> To gain them!"

"Vastly well, gentlemen!" says Mr. Puff, the author. "Is that well managed or not? Have you ever had such a prayer as that on the stage?" Perhaps not on the stage, but often enough off it.

> "God heard the embattled nations shout and sing,
> 'Gott strafe England!' and 'God save the King!'
> God this, God that, and God the other thing."

The medieval mind was genuinely puzzled as to what things were done with God's assistance and approval, and what things were done in defiance of His will. Even Innocent III. could confess himself puzzled. In 1204 the Crusade, instead of going to conquer Jerusalem from the Saracens, went for reasons of its own to Constantinople and sacked that Christian, though schismatic, city. After the event, which he had done his best to prevent, Innocent writes: "We do not wish to judge rashly the means employed by Providence. It is possible the Greeks have been punished justly for the sin they committed against God, but it is also possible that the Crusaders had not the right to punish them, and that they are guilty of hating their neighbour. But can one apply the term 'neighbour' to these schismatics who rejected the love of their brethren?" etc.

One more example from another period in the history of the Papacy. In the crisis of the struggle with Protestantism in the sixteenth century, Rome instituted the famous *Index librorum prohibitorum*, the list of books which the laity are forbidden to read. The original religious purpose of this censorship is plain and honest enough, however mistaken we may think it. Sixty years later, however, the Papacy, being involved in a quarrel with Venice, placed upon the *Index* all books published in Venice—a lock-out, *sub obtentu religionis*, against the Venetian book trade!

It is in no spirit of contempt towards the Papacy that we have selected from its history a few examples of a kind of religious pathology that could easily be illustrated elsewhere. Taking it all in all, the Papacy has been, perhaps, not only the most extraordinary but also the greatest of human institutions. It claimed to be God's representative, His substitute, His interpreter upon earth. With magnificent effrontery, yet in perfect good faith, the greater popes (for there were many great popes in different ages) shouldered the burden too heavy for man to bear. Needless to say, not a single one of them was worthy of the position he claimed to fill. No man could be. And yet, during a long period, the Papacy was the greatest civilizing force in the world.

The organization of which the Papacy was the head claimed to stand for the Divine government of the world. Could it

not, therefore, be maintained that the promotion of the welfare of the Papacy was equivalent to the promotion of the glory of God? This was a very natural but a very dangerous assumption; for out of such an assumption as this grew those strange obliquities, that curious pathological condition of the religious mind which we have been illustrating. It is all-important, let it be granted, that the people of Portugal should follow in the footsteps of Christ, their Pattern and their King. It would seem to follow, then, that it is all-important that the authority of the Papacy should prevail in that kingdom. But the Papacy, like any other human institution, cannot function without a sound economic basis, and it is therefore quite necessary that the King of Portugal should pay the tribute, which he can perfectly well pay, and to which he is bound by contract. But it is impossible to induce him to pay this tribute except by a bargain, which permits him to wage war at his pleasure upon possibly unoffending neighbours. It is true that these wars may be unjust; but then the King will probably undertake them in any case, and if the Papacy closes with the bargain, these wars will spread the authority of the Papacy, which is by hypothesis the Kingdom of God, in the provinces conquered.

Would one call the people whose minds worked along these lines hypocrites? That depends upon the meaning one attaches to "hypocrite," for the word seems to have changed its meaning in popular use. When we talk about a hypocrite to-day we generally mean, it seems, a conscious hypocrite. But hypocrisy properly understood is wider than that, and human psychology is more subtle than a division into conscious hypocrites and transparently honest men would seem to imply. When Christ called the Scribes and Pharisees hypocrites or "actors," He cannot have meant that they were fully conscious of the falsity of their professions, for the charge would have been notoriously untrue. He meant that they were self-deceivers, that, by an instinct of self-protection, they failed to discover to themselves their own motives. And so it must have been with the popes. The popes, like the Pharisees, were the heirs of an ancient tradition, the upholders of an ancient institution, the beneficiaries, if you will, of an ancient vested interest. How very easy to confuse the maintenance of the institution with the promotion of the purpose for which the institution existed. Heroism, Bishop Gore once said in an address at Cuddesdon, was a characteristic of the inheritors of great traditions, but not only heroism: "heroism and blindness of heart." The great tradition begins in a religious revelation; the institution in which it is embodied gathers about itself the political and economic machinery it requires; and then the

distinction between what is revelation and what is machinery becomes blurred, and "blindness of heart" sets in, which Christ called "hypocrisy."

But religion is much older than Christianity, and older than the traditions of the Pharisees. False religion is not only to be viewed as a corruption of true religion: it is its ancestor, and those curious perversions of religion which are illustrated at the beginning of this article were, at a much earlier date, religion itself. Gods and goddesses are identified with clans, tribes, and institutions, and exist to promote the welfare of these institutions, as welfare is conceived by their worshippers. The Hebrew prophets protested against the non-moral and "patriotic" cult of a purely tribal Jehovah, and in the course of a few centuries they appeared to have converted the pagan Israel of the eighth century to a rigidly-observed worship of an Almighty and Righteous God. But religious conversions are never complete, even though names be changed. The old paganism persisted underneath, and has persisted through all the ages, and things that are done *sub obtentu religionis* are not necessarily irreligious, though they are anti-Christian. They are surviving fragments of pagan religious ideas.

We have considered hitherto the case of institutions—the way institutions, and especially religious institutions, have of seeking what they conceive to be their own welfare, and persuading themselves that they are serving God thereby. But why take complicated and remote examples from historic institutions, when each individual can draw illustrations from his own life? In the prayer that has been provided for us as an example we are taught to say, "Thy will be done." But there are many times when that seems to most of us both too vague and too fatalistic, and fatalism is of the East, not of the West. But I am here on the edge of the subject of many thousands of sermons, a subject, too, upon which much that is profound and inspiring has been written during recent years, and I will go no further. Suffice it to say that when we alter the pronoun and pray "My will be done," we are mistaking the means for the end and ourselves for the Universe, and King Sancho I. of Portugal may claim us, however distantly, as a kinsman.

One of the best examples of "how not to do it" in the matter of prayer is to be found in Ibsen's *Peer Gynt*. That delightful person has just been marooned on the desert coast of Africa, and sees his friends sailing away. I quote from Mr. Archer's translation, with omissions:

> "A dream! I'm determined it shall be a dream!
> O horror! It's only too real, worse luck!
> My brute beasts of friends—! Do but hear me, O Lord!
> Since Thou art so wise and so righteous, O judge!

It is I, Peter Gynt ! Oh, our Lord, give but heed !
Hold Thy hand o'er me, Father: or else I must perish !
Make them back the machine ! Make them lower the gig !
Stop the robbers ! Make something go wrong with the rigging !
I'm blest if He hears me ! He's deaf as His wont is !
Here's a nice thing ! A God that is bankrupt of help !
Oh, help me on board—

[*A jet of fire shoots into the air from the yacht, followed by thick clouds of smoke ; a hollow report is heard. Gradually the smoke clears away ; the ship has disappeared.*]

That's the sword of wrath !
In a crack, to the bottom, every soul, man, and mouse !
Oh, for ever blest be the lucky chance—
A chance ? No, no, it was more than a chance.
I was to be rescued and they were to perish.
Oh, thanks and praise for that Thou hast kept me !
There's no cause for alarm. He would never allow
A poor little sparrow like me to perish !
Be lowly of spirit. And give Him time.
Only trust in Him. He knows well what share
Of the chalice of need I can bear to drain.
He takes fatherly thought for my personal weal;

[*Casts a glance over the sea, and adds with a sigh.*]

But economical—no, that He isn't !"

But, after all, the question is not a simple one. On a recent occasion some mothers were discussing their children's prayers, and were in doubt as to how far they should allow them to pray for trivialities such as birthday presents and success in their games. The answer seemed to be that they should pray for the best that they were capable of understanding, and that many petitions would come well from children that would ill befit the devotional exercises of philosophers. Yet, as most of us must always remain somewhere midway between the child and the philosopher, it would be difficult, indeed impossible, to draw any hard and fast line between what petition may or what may not come *sub obtentu religionis*.

After I had begun the composition of this, I fear, somewhat rambling essay, a daily paper (*Daily News*, April 26) furnished me with the most singular example of the perverted uses of religion that has ever come my way. The quotation that follows is from a "serious business communication," received by a Liverpool merchant from a customer in the United States:

"Enclosed please find copy of cable sent you yesterday. Although this country is dry, still the law allows us to bring in whisky in bond; it is then withdrawn for either sacramental or medicinal purposes as required. Recently a new religion has started up in ——, the members of which meet several times weekly, at which they are required, as part of the ceremonies, to drink as much whisky as they can conveniently carry; needless to say everyone has joined the faith, and a big demand has now sprung up for sacramental whisky. The police are powerless to stop the ceremonies, as the Courts have ruled in their favour, with the result that the police are now joining the faith fast, so we look forward to a steady business if you can quote competitive prices."

It is hard to believe that this is not a hoax; but whether hoax or not, it is an illustration, even though by way of parody or caricature. To seek whisky *sub obtentu religionis* is, no doubt, uncommon; but many other things are thus sought which, though non-alcoholic, are also non-Christian.

D. C. Somervell.

PLATO AND SIR THOMAS MORE

"My lords, I have but to say that like as the blessed Apostle Paul was present at the death of the martyr Stephen, keeping their clothes that stoned him, and yet they be now both saints in heaven, and there shall continue friends for ever, so I trust and shall pray that though your lordships have been on earth my judges, yet we may hereafter meet in heaven together to our everlasting salvation, and God preserve you all."

This was Sir Thomas More's farewell to the judges who had sentenced him to death. Perhaps it does as well as an elaborate account of his life, as an introduction to his *Utopia*. For the whole man was in it: his courage, his piety, and the effortless magnanimity which made him feel that their verdict discredited the judges hardly more than the prisoner. He always could see other people's points of view, from the time when, as a young man, he decided to propose not to the second daughter of "Mr. Colt of Essex," whom he most admired, but to the elder, lest she should feel slighted if her sister married first, to the day of his death when he dressed in his best, so that the executioner's perquisite of the clothes he died in should be more worth having. More was everywhere at home, at court, in a monastery, with Erasmus and his brilliant friends, with his own little girls and their pet animals. Perhaps his second wife, a prosaic housewife, was the person who most resisted his charm, but he persuaded even her when she was middle-aged to learn to play the lute.

A man with wide sympathies is the right person to devise Utopia, if it is to be a state where many types of men can be happy, but he is not necessarily the right man to have a successful career in politics. More saw too many sides of things for a public man of the Reformation time. The great questions of the day could not be answered in a way to please any party by a man who read his New Testament in Greek without leaving off his hair—shirtby one, that is, who knew from inside the strength and beauty of the old spirit, and of the new, and who could not be false to either side of his nature.

Circumstances made More a martyr for the papacy and

tradition, but it is not difficult to imagine other circumstances in which he would have been killed as an innovator and a rash reformer. He is one of the examples in which every revolutionary epoch is so tragically rich, of men too intelligent to feel and too honest to pretend that all the right in the quarrel is on one side, and who therefore are distrusted by both parties, and almost certain to be the victims of whichever wins. These men are, by their breadth of mind, as much qualified for political thought as handicapped in political action, and the ideal cities they build are likely to be worth a visit. More's reflects both the conservative and the reforming element in his character, but mainly the latter. Perhaps it is fair that as he was fated to give his life for the Old, his book should bear more traces of the New.

It was written in 1515, before More was made Speaker of the House of Commons, and while it was still reasonable to hope that the reform of the Church might be accomplished without schism, and that Henry VIII. would prove to be a philosopher King. More wrote in Latin, but his book has been most read in the English translation made in Elizabeth's reign by Raphe Robynson. The pretence is that More is introduced at Antwerp to a mariner, with the strange name of Raphael Hythlodaye,* who has been to the New World with "Amerigo Vespuce," and there chanced upon the island of Utopia. From his lips More learns how the Utopians manage things, and in his book he sets it down. Their way of life is certainly interesting enough to make us sorry that, when Raphael was explaining where exactly the island is, and how to be reached, "one of the company, by reason of a cold taken, I think, on shippeborde, coughed out so loud" that he deprived the others of this important information. We may infer with some safety, though, that Utopia is not far from the city of which Socrates told Glaucon.

Indeed, a good way to see the point of More's book is to take it as a footnote to the *Republic*, the comment of a practical Englishman, and a Christian, on Plato's political ideal. Of course, the *Utopia* is not a great work of philosophy like the *Republic;* the interest in it belongs to the details of the Utopians' lives, not to any discussion of the origin and nature of society, but it does show the direction which Christian criticism of Plato's ideal commonwealth must take, and it gives a concreteness to some of Plato's theories which is both English and stimulating.

More follows Plato in making Utopia a small and self-supporting state, though, nation states having come in since

* *I.e.*, nonsense-talker.

Plato's day, Utopia is larger than he would have liked. He also copies Plato's contempt for money, and describes in detail how the Utopians make themselves despise it. Plato merely says that only the lowest class is to possess money, but More tells how the Utopians use gold for convicts' chains, and give "perles and pretious stones" to the children for toys. There is a pleasant account of the pompous arrival in Utopia of foreign ambassadors with gold chains round their necks, and how the Utopians took them for bondmen, and children who had outgrown their own jewelled toys nudged their mothers, saying, "Look, mother, how great a lubbor doth yet were perles and pretious stones, as though he were a litel child still."

There is not only no money in Utopia, but no private property of any kind. There is complete community of goods, and in this, of course, More goes further than Plato, who only enforces it for the two higher classes. Here we touch upon one of the two fundamental disagreements between Plato, who insists on, and More, who ignores, class-distinctions. But, for the moment, the point is that Plato has taught More contempt for wealth.

More distinctively Platonic is the importance of education and knowledge in Utopia, and, indeed, Plato's Republic with the idea in it—not in Tudor times a truism—of the community's welfare coming first, and of the state controlling the lives of individuals, even rulers, for the good of the whole, is at the back of More's mind all through. It is, on the whole, in details that he dissents, but significant ones.

The actual constitution of Utopia is described more minutely than the Republic's. As a lawyer, More was interested in the details of government, and as an Englishman he was unwilling to give the King, however philosophical, the unlimited power Plato would put in his hands. The political unit in Utopia is the family (which reveals the second great difference between More and Plato), and every thirty families choose themselves a yearly magistrate called a Syphogrant. There are 200 of these, and every ten of them—with their groups of families—have another yearly official, a Tranibore, over them. The Prince is chosen for life by the Syphogrants from four candidates nominated by the whole people. The government is conducted by the Prince, who is compelled to call the Tranibores to council every third day, but matters of great weight are brought before the Syphogrants, or sometimes before "the whole Ilande."

Neither Henry VIII. nor Plato would have liked the democratic institutions of Utopia, but Plato would much have

approved of its laws. These are few in number, and always interpreted according to their " plain and gross " meaning. It is interesting that the future Lord Chancellor will have no professional lawyers in Utopia " with their craftye and subtill interpretations." He already knew too much of Chancery suits. Both Plato and More would like to do without lawyers, but there is more scope for doctors in Utopia than in the Republic, and more tolerance for the sick. More does not, like Plato, condemn all medical science that cannot wholly cure. Invalids are allowed in Utopia; the hospitals are " bigge, wyde, and ample," and " such as be sicke of incurable diseases they comfort with sitting by them."

Thus the Christian writer modifies the harshness of the Greek, but he sees Plato's point none the less, and describes how, in Utopia, if a man's illness is not only incurable but painful, the priests and magistrates try to persuade him to hasten his death. No one is put out of his pain without his own consent, but if he gives it, he is killed in his sleep and honourably buried.

Utopia is a much less military state than the Republic. " Warre or battel as a thing verye beastly they do detest and abhor," though they undergo strenuous military training, even—because of Plato—the women. Actual fighting, however, they hire mercenaries for whenever they can, paying them with the gold they have no use for themselves. They also, by lavish offers of reward, tempt their enemies to betray their leaders, or stir up revolts among them, or, failing this, " they reyse up the people that be nexte neyghebours . . . to theire enemies, and them they sette in theire nickes under the coloure of some olde tytle of ryghte, such as kynges doo never lacke." All this they call " playing the man " in war, and boast of it more than of courage which wild beasts also show, whereas only man can win wars by the " might and puissance of wit." This reads more like Macchiavelli than More, and it may seem odd to say that it is Christianity which makes him reject Plato's military ideal in its favour. Yet the whole point of Utopian military policy is to spare as many lives—on both sides, if possible—as may be. Also, when at length compelled to fight, the Utopians play the man in the other sense, the more that they are all volunteers, and that they fight surrounded by their own families, women and all. It is a great shame for a husband to return without his wife or a wife without her husband.

This once more brings us to More's widest divergence from Plato, or at least to one of the two main differences. More thinks that in battle and throughout life a man is a better

citizen because he has a family, Plato that the private and relatively selfish interests of the family cut across loyalty to the state, and that family boundaries must be deliberately obliterated.

More shows traces of Plato's view in grouping families into large households, and making up some people's shortage in children by handing over to them the superfluous offspring of others. A family in Utopia is thus larger than a natural one, and may not be all related by blood, but it is not much larger than More's own household at Chelsea, and remains a family still, not a barrack. It is very characteristic that he would not have a Utopia without family life. He was a proud and tender father, and ruled over one of the happiest homes in history, so it is natural that in the *Utopia* he should describe with zest the ordering of the big households, even to the details of meals. There are big halls in Utopia, and in each a whole Syphogranty—*i.e.*, thirty families—takes its meals together. A special "parloure" adjoins it for young babies and their mothers, where there is always a fire and cradles, so that "they maye laye downe the younge infantes, and at theyr pleasure take them out of their swathynge clothes, and holde them to the fire and refreshe them with playe." Everyone over five dines in the big hall, old and young sitting alternately. Something is always read aloud at meals, "pertaining to good manners and vertue, but it is shorte because no man shal be greved therwith." At supper there is always music, and "nothing is left undone that makes for the cheringe of the companye." It is to be feared that the Utopians did not censor their music with a perfectly Platonic strictness.

Throughout the description of Utopian customs one traces the implicit protest of the Christian against Greek contempt for the family. More is anxious to enlarge the conception of home; he would agree with Plato that family life can be narrowing, can be anti-social in its influence, but he cannot give it up. His ideal is really to get the solidarity which Plato aims at, not by destroying home life, but by extending it till all citizens feel themselves "everywhere at home." This involves him in the other great difference from Plato of which we spoke: he cannot acquiesce in the rigid class distinctions of the Republic. The leisure, the refinement, the education provided in Utopia must be for all.

This sounds like a mere pious aspiration, but More was a practical man, and he thought out practical measures for the attainment of his aim. Given the economic isolation which he postulates for Utopia, and which in the sixteenth century was a quite reasonable condition to make, there is no

absurdity in More's ideal of a six hours' working-day for everyone, and so of leisure and education for all. He realizes, however, that such short hours will not suffice if labour is diverted to the production of luxuries. It is, therefore, a law in Utopia that clothes must be of the simplest kind. No changes in fashion are allowed, and no delicacy of material. Men's clothes are to differ from women's, but everyone's cloak is to be of "the natural coloure of the wul." This no doubt saves a great deal of labour which would otherwise be spent on dyeing stuffs, but a sort of Jaeger-clad population seems inappropriate to Utopia.

There are more attractive features in More's scheme for eliminating a labouring class. One is that there are no "sturdy and valiaunte beggers" in Utopia, as the magistrates' chief duty is to see that everyone does his day's work, unless old or sick or having received of the people a "perpetual licence from laboure to learninge." There are no idle rich naturally, and no servants, since no one can pay wages. When it is added that, as we have seen, there are no professional lawyers or soldiers, and that shopkeeping and most of the distributing trades do not exist, in a country where all the product of labour is stored in great markets for anyone to help himself who will, it does not seem fantastic that a six hours' day should provide the population of Utopia with food, houses, and their limited wardrobe. It is not, however, much to the point to discuss the soundness of More's economics. His solution of the problem of labour may have been adequate for his age without being of the slightest value in the utterly different conditions of ours. What is important is that More saw, as Plato did not, that no state could be ideal which kept a large class of its citizens out of the best things it had to give. The Christian conscience again rejected the Greek ideal.

It is true that More partly begs the question of drudgery by assigning the heaviest and most unpleasant labour, such as the slaughter of cattle, to "bondemen," a non-citizen class made up partly of convicted criminals, and partly of foreign serfs, who prefer the comparative comfort of a Utopian bondman's life to poverty and drudgery in their own country. A bondman of this kind is not detained by force, and any bondman's children start life as citizens. That the bondmen are a flaw in the Utopian system is undeniable, but at least More is not, like Plato, content that the majority in his commonwealth should be practically outside its citizenship.

Thus the two main criticisms of Plato implicit in More are, that in trying to get rid of the family Plato is attempting something probably impossible, but certainly undesirable, and

that in confining education and political power to a minority in the state he is giving up the effort to construct an ideal republic.

Does this only mean that More faces facts less manfully than Plato, that he refuses to accept the unwelcome truth that human nature is so made, that the smaller loyalties of the family do often obliterate the larger loyalties of the state? Does he wilfully shut his eyes to the unfitness of many for either high education or political responsibility, or to the even more indisputable truth that if the whole population could be educated up to his standard, very few citizens would be content to be cowmen?

It is, of course, possible to maintain that the English statesman was really more unpractical than the Athenian lecturer, but another explanation is possible, too.

A new thing came into the world between Plato's time and More's, and it may be that More is more hopeful of human nature than Plato, not because he is less honest in facing facts, but because he has new facts to face. Human nature remains for him what it was for the Greeks, but he knows that Christianity can transform it. Christianity has often shown its sincere accepters how to be loyal to the community through serving their families, and to their families in serving the community. More himself died not less, but more bravely, for his principles, because of Margaret Roper's love, and, though this harmony of the greater and lesser loyalties can be matched among non-Christians, it cannot be so counted on from them. It is even clearer that a really Christian state could trust the ordinary citizen more than Plato could. He will only entrust the government of the Republic to a spectator of all time and all existence, but is there not a true sense in which any sincere Christian must be that? He must see the affairs of this life against a background of eternity, and that is the essence of what Plato demanded from his rulers, though he thought they could not gain it without a knowledge of solid geometry.

Given Christianity, then, More's Utopia is no longer incompatible with human nature, and, though More says the Utopians were not yet Christians, one feels, as one reads, that Raphael Hythlodaye must somehow have misled him there.

MARY MOORE.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

A Rural Dean writes:

"I am venturing to write and make a suggestion as one who takes in THEOLOGY and finds it very illuminating and valuable. Would it be possible to introduce now and then suitable Courses of Sermons for the sake of the clergy?

"As a much harassed Rural Dean, I constantly find town and country Clergy longing for direction and help with their sermons—and specially needing guidance about books to read.

"I feel sure that it would meet a very great need if someone would issue a short paragraph from time to time suggesting:

"A. *Standard books* on various subjects which the Clergy should read. This would help that large army of Priests who do not belong to Study Circles or Clerical Reading Societies.

"B. *Courses of sermons*—subjects only, of course, with recommendations of special books to read on the subject.

"Sunday evenings provide a special opportunity for 'the Ministry of the Word,' and if headings of subjects in a sort of sequence were suggested, it would stimulate the preacher and interest the congregation. . . ."

We have already made a beginning in regard to standard books; but we are grateful for the suggestion that these should have reference to the subject of sermons. We did publish a series of Sermon Outlines in the first six months of our existence; but this proposal would enable more to be done in shorter space. We will give it our careful consideration.

The Rev. P. H. Ditchfield writes with regard to the review of his "Old Village Life" in our May number to point out that many of the "errors" criticized by Mr. Fletcher had already been corrected in the second edition of the book, published soon after the first. On many other details he stands by what he wrote.

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

In the Review of *Materials for the Study of the Apostolic Gnosis*, published in THEOLOGY, July, 1922, a few statements need correction, but these do not affect the reasoning.

On p. 52 ἐκ σαρκὸς should read ἔνσαρκος and καὶ should be ἀεί. These are printer's errors, overlooked in correcting the proof.

On the same page, "Ah, I do not believe," should be "Eh, do not believe"—13, 19, 49, 60 = 141.

On p. 54 the corrected result is:

Jack and Jill went up the hill	260	Are you hurt, Jill	195
To fetch a pail of water ..	204	Ah, dear me, alas! Jill, my broken head	252
Jack fell down and broke his crown	295	Ah, spilt water cannot be collected	305
And Jill came tumbling after	232	Water flows downhill ..	239
	991		991

A few lines later 936 should be 991.

I regret that I should, through hastiness, have caused you to publish a few inaccurate figures.

HENRY LOWTHER CLARKE.

IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the enquiry to an expert; a number of well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

[Under this heading we hope to give simple explanations of New Testament passages intended for the non-specialist reader. Special attention will be paid to those passages where the R.V. rendering is not universally accepted by present-day scholars.]

St. Luke ii. 14

What was the angels' message?

In the Greek it runs thus: Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις Θεῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας (or εὐδοκία).

The Vulgate has: "Gloria in altissimis Deo, et in terra pax in hominibus bonae voluntatis."

The English A.V.: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men"; and the R.V.: "Glory to God in the highest, And on earth peace among men in whom He is well pleased."

There are, then, three possible English renderings of the last phrase: (1) Reading εὐδοκία, "good will among men." In spite of evidence from the papyri suggesting that εἰς with the accusative and ἐν with the dative were interchangeable in popular speech, it would be rash to translate "towards men." "Good will" may be understood to mean good will on the part of men for fellow-man, or God's good will now

manifested among men. The former meaning is unlikely, and even if it were in the writer's mind, his ultimate thought would probably have been that such good will was God's gift to man. (2) Reading εὐδοκίας, we may render "among men of good will," a beautiful phrase which is too readily ruled out as impossible; or (3) "among men in whom God is well pleased," according as the subject of the verb implied in εὐδοκίας is man or God.

The textual evidence is strongly in favour of εὐδοκίας. If it seemed difficult, nothing was easier than to cross out the final *s* of the genitive, as was actually done in one or two MSS., but it is hard to explain how εὐδοκίας arose out of an original εὐδοκία. The early Greek MSS. relied on by Westcott and Hort agree with the Western text and the Latin versions, against the later Greek MSS. supported by the Syriac versions.

Nevertheless, there is something to be said for the traditional English rendering.

1. Stress is laid on the Hebrew parallelism of the R.V. text, where there are three phrases in each clause—

1. Glory	2. to God.	3. in the highest.
3. On earth	1. peace	2. among men in whom He is well pleased.

But though this is the commonest form of parallelism, three clauses are frequent in Hebrew poetry. Compare, for instance, Psalm iii. 7, where *b* and *c* are two parallel clauses, answering *a* in the same way as "on earth peace," "good will among men," answer "Glory to God in the highest":

a. Arise, O LORD, save me, O my God:
b. For Thou hast smitten all mine enemies upon the cheek bone;
c. Thou hast broken the teeth of the wicked.

2. Some scholars say that the generally accepted text cannot be translated into Aramaic. *Barnasha* (son of man) is the Aramaic for "man," and the double genitive involved in "sons of men of good will" is not idiomatic. But the evidence of the Syriac version does not bear this out, and in any case the objection would not apply if a Hebrew original were supposed.

3. St. Luke is the universalist Gospel, and it is unlikely that the Evangelist recorded, as God's message to mankind, the news of peace to God's elect—for that is what the phrase comes to. Against this may be put the fact that St. Paul's universalism was concerned with elect from every nation, rather than with the salvation of all, and St. Luke naturally followed him in this respect. Besides, in the first two chapters of the Gospel, he is dealing with a little group of pious folk within the nation, who are waiting for the Messiah. Peace comes to them first.

It seems, then, that sufficient can be said in favour of the A.V. to justify us in retaining the traditional rendering in the *Gloria in Excelsis*, and in carols and hymns, though not in a revised Bible.

Finally, why should not we translate ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας by "men of good will"? The R.V. rendering rests on the assumption that εὐδοκία represents a Hebrew and Aramaic word, which must be taken of God's attitude towards men. But we are translating a Greek word, which, in Rom. x. 1 and Phil. i. 15, is clearly used of a man's feelings. And if εὐδοκίας meant "God's good pleasure," it is surprising that αὐτοῦ was not added.

NOTICES

CREEDS OR NO CREEDS. By Charles Harris, D.D. London, John Murray, 1922. Pp. xxvi + 383. 15s.

I find it a little difficult to review Dr. Harris's defence of orthodoxy against the rather motley congeries of views which he names collectively "Modernism" with complete satisfaction to myself. I hardly know, even, whether Dr. Harris would or would not call a person like myself a friend or a "Modernist" enemy. On the one side, I feel very strongly the force of his criticism of the loose and superficial thinking which he condemns, and the incomparably deeper and firmer hold of "orthodoxy" on the things of the spirit; on the other, when I try to examine the conclusive force of much of the polemic, I am left suspecting, and in some cases more than suspecting, that an intelligent "Modernist" would be able to make a fairly telling rejoinder. Perhaps the explanation is mainly that the tone of Dr. Harris's volume is too polemical. It is often hard to be sure that the highly heretical interpretations he puts upon seemingly innocent popular rhetoric are really what is meant by the objects of his attack, and in some cases one's sympathy is awakened for a victim by finding him made responsible for practical developments which seem to have no real logical connection with his utterances. To take an extreme example, there seems to me to be no intelligible reason why acceptance of the Rev. H. D. A. Major's theology need lead to loose views about sexual morality, and I cannot think it either fair or charitable that Freud or "Neo-Malthusianism" should figure in a discussion of the error of adoptionist views about the Incarnation. Indeed, a "Modernist" might reasonably say that the question of the *truth* of his metaphysics and theology is quite independent of the question what practical effect, if any, general adoption of them would have on moral practice. Truths, as well as errors, may be dangerous, if they are proclaimed at the wrong time, to the wrong persons, and in a wrong spirit. But the dangerousness of a statement, after all, does not disprove its truth. Dr. Harris gives his first eight chapters to an account of the genesis of "Modernism," and an attack on the metaphysics alleged to underlie it. This, in my judgment, is the weakest part of his book. Like some modern continental neo-scholastics, Dr. Harris traces all the ephemeral anti-intellectualistic philosophies which are so closely connected with the rise of "Modernism" back to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and makes a great show of demolishing the supposed errors of that famous work with a view to the rehabilitation of a rather commonplace Aristotelianism. One need be no Kantian to object strongly both to the affiliation of the modern anti-intellectualists to Kant and to Dr. Harris's account of what Kant taught. As to the first point, it is, of course, true that many strange doctrines have sought to derive a certain status of respectability from their claim to Kantian paternity, but it is at least equally certain that Kant, to whom mathematics remained the typical science, would have repudiated his alleged offspring. An adventurer's word cannot be safely taken about his own distinguished origin. And, as to the second, Dr. Harris's statements about Kant's actual teaching are so extraordinary as to suggest that if he has ever read the *Critique*, he has successfully forgotten all its contents. I should not speak so

strongly but for Dr. Harris's own boast (p. 67), that he has "reduced" the *Critique of Pure Reason* to "waste-paper." A writer who adopts this tone needs to be very sure of his ground.

Dr. Harris ascribes to Kant the following doctrines: (1) That the object of all knowledge is in all cases* *something purely mental* (p. 63); (2) that theology and ethics should be based on psychology (p. 71); (3) that all knowledge is derived from experience (*ib.*). As to (1), it is enough to remind Dr. Harris that Kant went out of his way to deny the doctrine, and, in particular, inserted in the second edition of the *Critique* a formal "Refutation of Idealism,"† on purpose to make the denial more explicit, and that upholders of this kind of "Idealism" have always, like Schopenhauer, depreciated the second edition on that very ground. As to (2), a doctrine from which, as Dr. Harris says, it would follow that there is no absolute moral obligation, every reader of the *Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics* ought to know that Kant expressly says that "it is of the utmost importance to beware that we never think of deducing the reality of" the supreme principle of obligation "from the specific peculiarities of human nature" (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, iv. 273). He insists that the principles of moral obligation hold not merely for man, but for "*any* rational being" (including God), and rejects all theories which base ethics on psychology for the express reason that they do not duly recognize the "sublimity" of the moral law (*ibid.* iv. 288 *ff.*). As to the third charge, the very first words of the *Introduction* to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are: "There is no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience . . . but it does not all arise from experience." If Kant had not held that we have knowledge which does not arise from experience, the problem which the whole work is written to solve would not have existed for him. I could give other equally remarkable instances in which Dr. Harris attributes to Kant positions which Kant expressly repudiates,‡ if space permitted, but the three already produced should be sufficient. It is rather amazing that neither the Bishop nor the Head of an Oxford House, who act as sponsors to Dr. Harris's work, should have had the elementary knowledge of Kant required to estimate the worth of these strictures on the Critical Philosophy.

When Dr. Harris gets away from his preliminary caricature of Kant, the quality of his work seems to me to show a great improvement. I find it easy to be in general sympathetic with his defence of the miraculous, and the general line of his argument for a sanely conservative view about the date and historical value of the New Testament documents. Even here, however, he seems to me not always to see what the real point to be established is. For instance, successful demolition of the argument against the miraculous does not of itself go far to establish the reality of a specific alleged miracle, and I feel sure that Dr. Harris has forgotten, with reference to the particular miracle which he makes most of, that of our Lord's Nativity, that the real difficulty felt by so many is one which he never even mentions. It is not that the alleged event is unique, but precisely that it is *not* unique. Virgin births are the most familiar of

* Italics, Dr. Harris'.

† *Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, iii. 197. The object of the refutation is to *prove* that we have actual "experience of external things."

‡ He repeats the absurd complaint that Kant invented a new faculty called "practical reason." Kant's own argument for the "primacy of the practical reason" is precisely that it is the *same* reason which, as speculative, creates science and, as practical, reveals the moral law.

things to the anthropologist, and that is precisely why the modern reader of the Gospels asks himself why he should, in this one case, accord a credence to the story which he denies, as a matter of course, to countless other stories of the same kind. I do not say that there may not be a very good reason why, but I cannot feel that Dr. Harris has done much to make it apparent. And I think he over-rates what he has proved. I find myself quite in accord with him in holding that the belief was known to St. Mark, and presumably accepted by the earliest New Testament writers. But the attempt to trace back St. Luke's story to our Lord's mother herself is, at best, a speculative guess, which may be correct, and no more, like the guessing by which Dr. Harris gets from the reasonable position that the " beloved disciple " was an eye-witness of certain events, to the conclusion that he was the Apostle John. Similarly I personally agree with Dr. Harris that the empty tomb is a necessary feature of the first belief in the Resurrection, but to prove that the Apostles were convinced, and rightly convinced, that they had seen the Lord alive after His burial, is not quite the same thing as to prove that He rose from the dead. The most complete evidence would still leave the conceivable possibility that there had been no real death. To my own mind, in both the cases, the article of the Creed asserts something which goes beyond not only the existing evidence, but all conceivable evidence, and I doubt if it is in the interest of orthodoxy to conceal this.

Another line of argument, of which Dr. Harris makes a great deal, is that which aims at proving that the whole of orthodoxy, as equivalent to everything determined by the first seven Councils, is implicit in the New Testament. In the sense that orthodoxy is, in the main, the inevitable development of the leading ideas of the New Testament, I should not dispute this. But Dr. Harris's insistence on the " immutability of dogma " suggests to me that he means a good deal more. He seems to hold, for example, not merely that St. Paul's Christology was in spirit Athanasian, rather than, *e.g.*, Adoptionist, but that St. Paul consciously held the precise doctrine of Nicæa, only that he had not the actual technical terms in which to express it. No allowance is made for the very real possibility that St. Paul had not a single definite and articulated doctrine, but rather a dominant conviction, crossed from time to time by lines of thought which will not readily fuse with it. So again, unless one attributes to the earliest Christians a preoccupation with theoretical dogma, and a precision of thought with which some of us find it hard to credit them, we may reasonably feel that an exegesis has hardly been proved to have been undisputed throughout the history of the undivided Church, by simply showing that it is as old as Augustine or Jerome. Yet this kind of argument is indispensable if we are to accept Dr. Harris's contention that all the articles of the Creed had a single undisputed sense from the days of the Apostles to the second Council of Nicæa. (The statement, if made in connection with the article *descendit ad inferos*, for example, seems very strange to myself.) Yet, when all is said, I can conceive a " Modernist " turning the tables on Dr. Harris. " You maintain," he might say, " that the sense of the articles has always been the same; it is only secondary and unessential supplements, really forming no part of the essence of the interpretation, which have varied. Well, I, too, hold that when my views have become general, as I believe they will, it will be seen that the essence of the interpretation of such and such an article has always remained the same. What will have fallen

away will be only unessential supplementation, though you at this moment mistake it for the substantial sense." I confess I do not quite see how Dr. Harris would, on his own principles, meet this, unless he fell back on simply postulating the actual infallibility of the first seven Councils. And in arguing with the "Modernist" that would be a *petitio principii*. A refutation of "Modernism" which assumes the infallibility of these Councils will only convince those who are convinced already. I think, though Dr. Harris does not formally assert their infallibility, he is not quite clear about the difference between authoritativeness and infallibility. I can easily go wholly along with all that he says about the authority rightly attaching to an interpretation of Christianity which has behind it the tradition, devotion, and learning of centuries, and I think it most timely to remind the rash innovator of the worth of such an authority, but it is a long way from conviction of the worth of the authority to conviction that it is inerrant, and this must not be forgotten when it is insisted, truly enough, that science, too, has a rightful place for "authority." In short, I feel that Dr. Harris is wholly right in his insistence on the point that no religious system which tries to whittle down the meaning of the transcendence of God, of the Incarnation, or of the Resurrection, has any claim to call itself Christian, but when he attempts to prove that the work of formulating the principles of the religion of the Incarnation has been fully done, beyond all possibility of modification, by the first seven Councils, I should say that he is trying to prove more than his premisses warrant. Perhaps he would appeal to the promise of the Comforter, but are not all God's promises conditional, and when we consider the character and spirit of some of those who played a prominent part in some of the Councils, can we feel quite satisfied that the promise of the Comforter guarantees *all* their decisions? In a word, my own feeling, at least, is that the future of Christianity lies with orthodoxy and not with "Modernism," and that, so far, Dr. Harris is right, but his conception of orthodoxy strikes me as altogether too mechanical.

A. E. Taylor.

The Proof of the Gospel, being the Demonstratio Evangelica of Eusebius of Cæsarea. By W. J. Ferrar. 2 vols. S.P.C.K. 30s.

This is decidedly a sound scholarly production, and Mr. Ferrar has taken it seriously in hand, and deserves high praise for a good translation, a thoughtful preface, and some really useful notes. The critic has here not so much to appraise the value of the work of the scholar who has produced the volumes before him, as to discuss whether they were worth presenting to the public.

The *Demonstratio Evangelica* is, like every ancient and elaborate apology, somewhat tedious to read. It is the production of an extraordinarily learned man, and one who was acquisitive rather than original. It is mainly occupied with the argument from prophecy for the truth of the Christian religion, and its exegesis is not that of our day. Eusebius lacks the vigour of Tertullian, the brevity of Aristides, the grace of Minucius Felix, and the dramatic power of Justin in his Dialogue with Trypho; yet not only can we never be too grateful for his *Ecclesiastical History*, without which we should be completely without a clue to the progress of Christianity, and for his *Chronology*, the absence of which

would leave us hopelessly at sea in reckoning the dates of the whole story of classical antiquity, but his personality is one of the most interesting in the ancient world. This is certainly revealed in the work before us.

Two great English scholars, both Cambridge professors, have highly commended Eusebius of Cæsarea. The first was that most erratic genius, Dr. Whiston, the translator of Josephus, whose admiration for Eusebius equalled his detestation of St. Athanasius. More than a century and a half later Dr. Lightfoot, in a monumental article in the *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, has more than vindicated the memory of Eusebius, whose orthodoxy has always been suspected owing to his devotion to Origen and the cautious reservation with which he accepted the Creed of Nicæa. His adulation of the Emperor Constantine has also been a cause of prejudice against him.

The fact is that Eusebius was a combination of a convinced Christian, an omnivorous reader and indefatigable writer, and an ecclesiastical politician in one of the most exciting periods of history. He was an eyewitness of some of the worst aspects of the great persecution; he rejoiced in the Peace of the Church; he was active in the Arian controversy as the adviser of the Emperor Constantine. As a loving student of antiquity his temperament was naturally conservative, and his natural disposition inclined him to counsels of moderation. Both his erudition and his good sense are apparent in his *Demonstratio*.

Mr. Ferrar suggests that the reader should begin with the third book, and hints that much of the rest need not be read through. Knowing the *Demonstratio* as a book to be referred to rather than perused, we began by following this advice. Certainly the third book is interesting and singularly modern in tone, when Eusebius defends our Lord against the accusation that He was a wonder-working sorcerer, by appealing to His beauty of character and the purity of His teaching. The arguments remind one of those of the English Apologists of the eighteenth century, but they are distinguished by a warmth and feeling which are conspicuously absent from the utilitarian appeals of such a defender of the faith as Paley. There is one chapter which is quite a masterpiece of ironic reasoning, in which Eusebius meets the objection that the Apostles were wilfully deceived when they went forth to preach Jesus to the world, and to destroy the belief in its gods (iii. 5).

But on leaving this third book and reading the diffuse argument as to prophecy, we were convinced that Eusebius' exegesis deserves the attention of the modern student. It is impossible not to admire his scholarly method and the use of his material, as well as his use of history and chronology. Of especial interest is the discussion of the prophecy of the virgin birth of Immanuel in Isaiah vii., and of the renderings of the LXX. Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, whose versions he is constantly comparing with his own (see Book VII.). There is also a very curious discussion of Habakkuk iii. 2–5, on the accentuation of the word ζωων, and a strange interpretation of the passage as a reference to the human and divine natures of our Lord (Book VI.).

In treating of the theology of Eusebius, and the strong influence of the subordinationism of Origen upon it, Mr. Ferrar points out that his letter to the Church of Cæsarea, in which he gives a careful explanation of his reasons for accepting the Creed of the Council of Nicæa, and the sense in which he himself subscribed to it, is absolutely frank, in view of the *Demonstratio* belonging to the period before the Arian controversy. The

interest in a book like the *Demonstratio* is historical, rather than apologetic. Probably no "apology," ancient or even comparatively modern, is likely to convert the reader, but almost all are deserving of careful study as revealing the conditions of the writer's mind and the thought of his age. One of the great problems of to-day is to discover what primitive believers really thought, and how far their Christianity resemble ours. And it is even harder to realize what was the actual religious motive in the fourth century. Eusebius helps to solve the puzzle. In many respects he is remarkably modern, as also is Porphyry, the protagonist of the older religion. Both were critically minded, both lived in an age of tradition, when the religion of the future was in suspense. But Eusebius touches our age in the value he sets on the moral influence of the teaching of Christ and of His character. He probably wrote his *Demonstratio* when Christian principles seemed to have triumphed by the recognition of the Church by the Roman Government, and before the disillusionment which came as the reign of Constantine approached its close. The book is therefore a revelation of the years between the edict of Milan and the Arian controversy, of which too little is known. We hope that Mr. Ferrar's labours may arouse the interest of scholars and historians, and congratulate him on his achievement.

F. J. Foakes-Jackson.

Holy Unction: A Dogmatic Treatise on the Unction of the Sick. By Archdale A. King, Priest of St. Saviour's, Poplar. Society of SS. Peter and Paul. 1s. 6d.

We have here a very valuable chain of quotations establishing the Catholicity of the use of Holy Unction for the Sick. The author urges that it has been and may be rightly regarded as a Sacrament of the New Law "foreshadowed (*insinuatum*)" in the Gospels. He is desirous that the authorities of the Catholic Provinces of Canterbury and York, to whom he expresses unswerving loyalty, shall uphold and promulgate the customary teaching of Catholic Christendom and not regard Unction as only an "Established" form of faith-healing. He suspects Fr. Puller and Dr. Dearmer of "setting up beliefs and practices in opposition to the rest of Christendom in order to pour scorn on the Church of Rome" by "maintaining that the true primitive doctrine was due to a mere sacramental institution for the supernatural healing of bodily sickness only." The "two divergent views" of the Sacrament which have encouraged Fr. King's careful research are, we think, stated with some exaggeration. It is certainly unfair to those within the Anglican Communion who advocate the use of Unction as a Sacrament of Healing to say that they "merely seem to emphasize the body at the expense of the soul, only desiring the restoration to bodily health, and so giving undue prominence to temporal blessings": reference to any of the publications of the Guild of St. Raphael would correct this misunderstanding. Moreover, a careful study of Fr. King's own quotations reveals that in East and West there has been always—and not least in the Roman Communion since the Council of Trent (pp. 26-27)—a fear lest physical benefits should be disregarded. Have not the Bishops at Lambeth given us a phrase which defines the grace of the Sacrament—"the release of Christ's power to heal"? This is indeed a spiritual benefit conferred on the whole man, not on his body only. Towards the end of his treatise (p. 33) Fr. King implies that this is his own position.

R. P. Roseveare.

THE LIFE OF BISHOP PERCIVAL. By William Temple, Bishop of Manchester. Macmillan. 1921. Pp. viii + 376. 18s.

If this book may fairly be described as slight, that is due primarily to the scantiness of the material available. The author tells us that Bishop Percival kept no diary, and was not a prolific letter-writer. He outlived the majority of his intimate friends, and six of his eight children. The resources at the disposal of his biographer were therefore not abundant.

We incline to think that as Dr. Temple proceeded with his task he found it more difficult than he had anticipated. He has set himself to write the life of a man much older than himself whom he honours deeply. Naturally he wishes his readers to do the same. If he has not succeeded in presenting a portrait likely to produce this effect, the cause of his failure is to be found in his theme rather than in his handling of it.

Bishop Percival's life, as depicted by Dr. Temple, must be regarded as of the nature of a tragedy. For we are shown a man in whom really great gifts of heart and mind were to a very large extent brought to naught by one outstanding defect. Percival would never, it appears, really tolerate any view or opinion which he did not share. If anyone presumed to disagree with him, the dissentient was *ipso facto* intellectually contemptible. He never made the least effort to understand the position of those who differed from him—because he did not think it worth while. In certain directions his ignorance appears to have been almost incredible. He had no conception of the Church beyond a "national establishment," instituted presumably by Henry VIII. He considered that only one episode in its history was worth studying. His inability to face facts as they are, which emerges again and again, reached its climax in his surprise and disappointment at not becoming Archbishop of York in succession to Maclagan. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seems to have encouraged him to look for this. But the Bishop's warmest admirers must be grateful to Mr. Asquith for refusing to redeem a pledge which ought never to have been given; which, moreover, had proceeded from one whose utter ignorance of the Church of England, and all which pertained to it, was notorious.

Yet Percival was a very great head master. *Testibus* Clifton and Rugby. He also did much for the cause of education in general. And he inspired very warm feelings of admiration and direction in those who knew him best. But he seems never to have shaken off the limitations of the north-country yeoman stock from which he came—just as he never surrendered its virtues. His limitations were perhaps intensified by the fact that he was an ardent "Liberal" in the technical sense. He never hesitated to claim moral authority for his own opinions. No Pope was ever more confident of his own infallibility; no trade union official was ever more hostile to freedom.

Perhaps the explanation of this strange mixture of success and failure, strength and impotence, insight and blindness, is to be found in the impression which he, as President of Trinity College, Oxford, produced on a young Fellow of the same College by name Charles Gore. "We felt that a great, strong, righteous will was expressing itself among us with profound astonishment at our being content to be such fools as we were; and this was to me very bracing."

No doubt it was impressive. Percival must always have been that. But the character which it reveals has more affinity with the stoic than

with the Christian type. We can believe that a stoic might be a very good schoolmaster, but we are quite certain that he ought never to attempt to discharge the office and work of a Bishop.

The book is smoothly and lucidly written. It will naturally be of great interest to all who have had to do with Clifton or with Rugby, and they are many. We hope that others will read it too, if only to note the nemesis which always lies in wait for intellectual arrogance.

THE MESSAGE OF HOSEA. By Melville Scott, D.D. Preface by the Dean of Lichfield. Pp. vi + 151. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

Dr. Scott has endeavoured to offer us a fresh interpretation of the meaning of one of the greatest books the world holds. He comes to his task with many useful qualifications. From start to finish one is conscious that one is reading the work of a real Hebrew scholar, with a sane and balanced judgment, and, best of all, a deep appreciation of the prophet and his evangelical message. There are one or two critical emendations on the text which seem likely to solve problems which have puzzled all editors, and there is a translation of the book which is bound to attract and edify the reader.

A large part of Dr. Scott's time is spent in refuting the critical position of earlier scholars, particularly Harper. One cannot help feeling that this is somewhat unfortunate. Whilst the logic may be unanswerable, it is to-day beside the point. The trouble is that Dr. Scott agrees far too much with his opponent, and has failed to realize that a great deal in Harper's position belongs to an earlier attitude towards the prophetic books, an attitude which is fast becoming obsolete. Comparatively few living Old Testament students think of the prophets as sitting down to compose long and elaborate strophic poems. Such arrangement as there is—there are exceptions, such as Ezekiel and Haggai—is ascribed to collectors of oracular matter, who may have lived long after the prophet whose sayings they compiled. The result is that the whole theory of "interpolations" has to a large extent disappeared, and there is a much greater readiness to admit the "authenticity" of passages which "do not fit their context" or "interrupt the progress of the argument."

But, in any case, a scholar's Higher Criticism is frequently the least valuable part of his work, and one can read Dr. Scott's translations and expositions with real pleasure and profit.

TRACTATE BERAKOTH. Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. Lukyn Williams, D.D. Pp. xxv + 95. S.P.C.K. 6s.

One of the most useful services modern scholarship can render to the reader of the Gospels is to help him to reconstruct the background of thought which was characteristic of Judaism in the days of Jesus. As far as this concerns the Pharisaic point of view, this task can only be properly performed through a study of the writings of the Rabbis and the Rabbinic Schools of the first century. Whilst it is true that there is much in these writings, as they are embodied for us in the Talmud, which is later than the time of Christ, yet the earliest stratum of the Talmud—what is known as the Mishnah—does give a remarkably accurate picture of the Pharisaic outlook on life and the Pharisaic attempt to interpret and observe the Law.

Consequently a book such as Dr. Williams has given us would be,

in any case, welcome. Its value is enhanced by the quality of the Editor's scholarship, and by the fact that he has included not only the Mishnah itself, but that later exposition of the Law which is known as the Tosephta. The Introduction and the Notes will also be found most useful, and one welcomes the brief sketches of the individual Rabbis which appear from time to time.

T. H. Robinson.

BOOK NOTES

Lectures on the Apocalypse. By R. H. Charles, D.Litt., D.D. Oxford University Press. Pp. viii + 80. 6s.

These Schweich Lectures for 1919 are published on behalf of the British Academy. They add little to what is found in the lecturer's great commentary, and since this was so fully reviewed by Dr. Moffatt in our February, 1921, number, we may be absolved from giving more than a brief notice here. If any one really knows his way about the commentary, he need not buy this book. But the big book is so long and intricate, that a short guide book to its main features, such as these lectures form, will be valued by many.

One cannot but feel irritation with an author who claims (p. 3) that 99 out of 100 expositors, previous to himself, were disqualified for their task by their ignorance of Apocalyptic, and more than 99 out of 100 by their ignorance of the unique grammar and style of the book studied. But irritating though the claim to unique qualifications is, it is probably justified. Few scholars can ever have subjected themselves to so severe a discipline spread over so many years as did Dr. Charles, as a preparation for his great commentary. The wayfaring men of the past have been fools as regards the solving of the abstruse literary problems of the book, though as regards spiritual values they have not erred therein. Even so great a scholar as Dr. Swete is left far behind in many ways by Dr. Charles. But is it not more in accordance with the comity of scholarship to let others say pleasant things about oneself, than to emphasize one's own superiority by detracting from the merits of others ?

The Social Implications of Christianity. By John Lee. S.C.M. 4s. 6d.

The hardened book-buyer will guess beforehand the contents of a book with this title, resembling so many others familiar to him, and his anticipations will be exactly realized. At a certain stage of mental development Mr. Lee's book will be found useful, but it can hardly be recommended to the general reader. No clear impression as to what it is all about remains after the reading is finished, though the atmosphere is devout and helpful. The main ideas have been expressed often already, and more successfully. But we are probably unfair to the author, who has a definite public in his mind and knows what they need. A thoughtful youth at the University will be introduced to modern social problems by means of this book pleasantly enough.

Storm and Sunshine in South Africa: with some Personal and Historical Reminiscences. By A. T. Wirgman, D.D. Longmans. 340 pp. 7s. 6d.

The late Archdeacon Wirgman left behind at his death an autobiography which, though it had not the advantage of the author's

revision, well deserved publication. The writer took a leading part in many events which have now become historical in the records of South Africa. Dr. Wirgman was always a fighter, but strenuous methods are needed in a new land, and by the end of his life he enjoyed the universal respect of the community both in Church and State.

Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament. By G. Abbott-Smith, D.D., D.C.L. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 20s.

Quem dei oderunt faciunt lexicographum is, one would imagine, true. But some minds must enjoy the toil of compiling a dictionary, otherwise they could never overcome the difficulties. Certainly the rest of mankind owe them a debt of gratitude. If this is true of an ordinary lexicon, how much more true is it of any book which helps us to understand the Sacred Scriptures better. Dr. Abbott-Smith has planned a New Testament lexicon for the study table which shall be well abreast of research, convenient to handle, and in respect of size filling a gap between Grimm-Thayer on the one hand and Souter's pocket lexicon on the other. He has succeeded admirably in his purpose. Readers of THEOLOGY will be interested to learn that he has from the outset taken a warm interest in our journal, and has, indeed, acted as Canadian correspondent.

To criticize such a book is practically impossible. Months, if not years, of constant use are necessary fully to appraise its merits and defects. All a reviewer can do is to say whether or not the plan is faithfully carried out. A confident " Yes " can be said in answer to such a question. The arrangement is lucid, the symbols and abbreviations readily grasped. Special features of the book are the references to the LXX and to modern writers. If one has any doubt as to the wisdom of the plan, it is in regard to the latter. To make room for them, quotations from Greek writers other than canonical have been sacrificed almost entirely. In some ways this is a pity. Modern books represent one stage in rapidly advancing knowledge, and soon cease to be modern, whereas the apposite illustrative passage from Philo or Epictetus would never be anything but apposite. The compiler would probably say that few students ever look up references, and there was no room to give passages in full. But the same objection applies to the modern books, the abbreviations for which fill four pages. To the advanced student alone are most of these likely to be accessible, and he, if he has formed a habit of constantly using concordances, will have largely outgrown this particular lexicon.

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